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Abstract 
 
Why are some peoples still poor? Recent research suggests the possibility that some societies 
may be poor due to their genetic endowments, which are found to be a significant predictor of 
development even after controlling for an ostensibly exhaustive list of geographic and cultural 
variables. We find, by contrast, that the impact of genetics on living standards is not robust to the 
inclusion of basic geographic controls.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Why are some peoples still poor? Recently, economic research has begun to investigate the role 
that genetics plays in the wealth of nations. One prominent example is Spolaore and Wacziarg 
(2009) ― henceforth SW ― who argue that the revolution in technological innovation which 
began in Lancashire cotton textiles circa 1760 spiraled outwards first to the immediate locale, 
then to the whole of Britain, soon to the entire English-speaking world, and finally to other 
culturally and genetically similar peoples of the world.1 Today, with the United States at the 
forefront of the world technological hierarchy, SW find that various distances to the United 
States, measured geographically, culturally, and genetically, are determinants of a society's level 
of technology and development.  
 The authors are careful to point out that the significance of their genetic distance variable, 
a measure based on the time elapsed since two societies' last common ancestor developed by 
Cavalli-Sforza et. al. (1994), does not necessarily imply any direct influence of genetics on 
income, but could likely proxy cultural barriers to technological diffusion. However, the authors 
report that genetic distance "has a statistically and economically significant effect on income 
differences across countries, even controlling for measures of geographical distance, climatic 
differences, transportation costs, and measures of historical, religious, and linguistic distance."2 
Were the impact of genetics on development robust to geographic and cultural controls, this 
would seemingly be evidence in favor of a direct impact of genetics on income, and would be an 
interesting and important result, in addition to being provocative and heavily-cited.3  
 While the authors deserve credit for introducing a taboo variable into the development 
discourse, we find that the evidence offered in support of the theory that genetic distance predicts 
development is sensitive to the inclusion of two simple, intuitive geographic controls: latitude 
and an Africa dummy. 4  Our findings are consistent with the theory that the technologies 
developed during the Industrial Revolution diffused first to other temperate regions of the world 
― where European agricultural technology could be deployed and where the disease 
environment was most favorable to European people, and thus to their human capital, institutions, 
technology, seeds, animals and germs. Indeed, this is the theory developed by a long line of 
scholars, including Kamarck (1976), Crosby (1972, 1986), Diamond (1992, 1997), Sachs (2001), 
Gallup, Mellinger and Sachs (2000), and Gallup and Sachs (1999) who all stress the importance 
of climatic similarity for development. In a world with trade costs, where the stability of GDP 
per capita rankings across decades implies that history matters, and where Malthusian forces 
have certainly been a strong force historically and are debatably still at play in some developing 
countries (see Clark, 2008), the nature of agricultural technology diffusion and the historical 
disease environment will necessarily carry outsized importance for development. The theory as 
laid out by scholars from Kamarck to Sachs explains why distance from the equator should be a 
key determinant of prosperity, and empirical growth economists have long since discovered that 
income and latitude are highly correlated (with Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [2001] and 
                                                 
1
 Two other examples are Spolaore and Wacziarg (2011), who use the same genetic data and make a similar 
argument, and Ashraf and Galor (2008), who look at ethnic diversity.  
2
 Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), p. 469. 
3
 Indeed, "The Diffusion of Development" was covered in the popular press in a David Warsh column, now is 
commonly featured on graduate reading lists, including at Harvard, MIT, Tufts, NYU, UC Davis, Stanford, Duke, 
the Hong Kong Institute of Science and Technology, and many others, and already has roughly 150 citations on 
google scholar.   
4
 Giuliano, Spilimbergo, and Tonon (2006) have found the same thing for just Europe.  
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Engerman and Sokoloff [1997] providing two additional stories for why this might be), although 
the mechanism is in dispute.  
 To our knowledge, no other paper has shown that simple geography controls can account 
for the puzzling apparent impact of genetics on development.5  
 
 
    II. EMPIRICS 
 
 In columns (1) and (2) in Table I, we have reproduced the baseline results from SW's 
Table I, finding that "genetic distance to the US," measured as the amount of time elapsed since 
the populations in these countries separated, is a significant predictor of income per capita. Yet, 
while these columns contain "New Trade Theory" geographic controls, they do not contain any 
"climatic similarity" controls. "Absolute difference in latitude" is included, but "absolute 
difference in absolute latitude" -- distance from the equator -- is not. The reason why the latter is 
the appropriate control should be clear: although the Southern Cone countries, South Africa, and 
Australasia all have very different latitudes than the US, they have similar climates owing to 
their similar absolute latitudes with Europe and the United States. (Appendix Figure A.1 shows 
the familiar nonlinear relationship between income and absolute difference in latitude with the 
US.) SW themselves discuss the importance of including climatic similarity variables, writing 
that latitude could affect income directly, or via technology diffusion, yet climatic similarity 
variables are curiously omitted as controls from their primary results in Table I.  
 It might be that "genetic distance" explains why it is that latitude is so highly correlated 
with development -- that Europeans settled in areas with climates similar to Europe, and these 
places are now developed owing to their European institutional endowment, superior genes, or 
human capital. In column (4), however, when we include distance from the equator and a dummy 
for the 41 Sub-Saharan African nations in our sample -- the very first specification we tried after 
coding up the dataset -- the coefficient on genetic distance falls substantially, rendering the 
results insignificant.6 As distance from the equator is an imperfect proxy for climate, when we 
include a more precise climate variable, the percentage of each country's land area in the tropics 
or sub-tropics in column (5), the point estimate falls even further.  
 One might protest the inclusion of the dummy for Sub-Saharan African nations on the 
grounds that this is perfectly correlated with the genetic distance variable, but this is actually not 
the case. Many East African nations, such as Ethiopia, are actually closer to the US genetically in 
the Cavalli-Sforza data than are some East Asian countries, such as Japan. Secondly, there is 
more genetic variation within Sub-Saharan Africa than there is in the entire rest of the world. 
Thirdly, as seen in Table I, latitude and the percentage of land area in the tropics or sub-tropics 
are still significant at 99.9% when an Africa dummy is included, even though Sub-Saharan 
African nations generally have a much higher proportion of land in tropical areas. Fourth, as 
explained in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Kamarck (1976), Crosby (1972, 1986), 
Diamond (1992, 1997), and Sachs (2001), among others, Africa is very different from other 
                                                 
5
 In a coterminous working paper, Luis Angeles (2011) shows that SW's genetic proxy is sensitive to the inclusion of 
12 additional linguistic, religious, colonial, geographic and another genetic control (percentage of population with 
European ancestry, not counting mestizos). The inclusion of so many additional controls should lead to a concern 
about overfitting, while including another genetic variable only serves to strengthen SW's original result, if anything.  
6
 A key statistic, although rarely reported, in the refutation of any statistical finding is how many specifications were 
tried before the results were reversed.  
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tropical areas in terms of its historical mortality rates, disease environment, pests, biodiversity, 
and geographic features. The entire region shares various geographic and cultural traits of which 
we are only controlling for a small subset, and so to "control for geography" one should naturally 
include dummies for large geographic regions, including Africa. That genetic distance is really 
just picking up the impact of latitude and the Africa dummy makes the result substantially less 
interesting. 
 
[Insert Table I] 
 
 SW offer evidence (their Table IV) that relative genetic distance to the US is correlated 
with income differences generally. To show this, they take the difference in per capita GDP for 
each dyadic combination of 144 countries, manufacturing 10,296 highly dependent data points, 
and use this as the dependent variable with the regressor of interest now being the relative 
genetic distance to the US.7 It should be noted that if genetic distance to the US is not a predictor 
of income as we found above, then it follows that relative genetic distance to the US between any 
two countries should not be a predictor of their income differences.  We include our Table II in 
the interest of being thorough.  
 The first column in Table II benchmarks SW's results, and then in column (2) we show 
that the inclusion of continent dummies eliminates the result. While SW correctly stress the 
importance of including continent dummies in their analysis, their novel method of 
implementing these dummies oddly forces the income difference between North and South 
America to be the same as the difference between North America and Africa. If instead we allow 
a separate dummy for each continent pairing -- i.e., a dummy for North America paired with 
South America, and a separate dummy for South America paired with Africa -- then the results 
disappear. Including these dummies does not render the "climatic similarity" geography variables 
insignificant in columns (3) and (4), even though including continent dummies clearly reduces 
the variation in these variables.  
 
[Insert Table II] 
 
 To conclude, the results presented above show that genetic distance as a predictor of 
development is sensitive to the inclusion of simple geographic controls. Our findings provide 
additional evidence for the surprising importance of geographic similarity variables, if not the 
exact mechanism by which these variables impact development. Future research should continue 
the work of Spolaore and Wacziarg, to introduce creative new variables with the potential to 
explain why some peoples are poor, and why climatic similarity has been such a strong force 
historically -- but the answer to this mystery does not lie in our genetic differences.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Just as one might worry about the independence of the original 144 observations, as there is likely to be regional 
correlation. Those worries are likely to multiply when one creates 10,296 data points based on differencing 144 
observations which were unlikely to be independent to begin with. Hence, the bar for significance in Table II is 
likely to be lower than in Table I, and the standard errors for genetics are generally about half as large.  
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TABLE I 
Income Level Regressed On Various Distances From the United States, 1995 
(1)         
Univariate 
 
(2)                  
SW's  
Baseline 
Controls 
 
(3)                    
Add Africa 
dummy 
 
(4)                           
Add distance 
from equator 
 
(5)                               
Add (%) of 
land area in 
tropics and 
sub-tropics 
 
FST genetic distance to the    
   United States, weighted 
-14.80775 
                 
  -14.315***      -8.815*** -3.782 -1.617 
       
(1.493)     (1.958) (2.579)  (2.738)  (2.844) 
Absolute difference in  latitude  
   from the United States      1.364**     1.416**      1.218** 
         
   1.519*** 
 
Absolute difference in longitude  
   from the United States 
    (0.589) (0.542) (0.489)  (0.529) 
     0.801*   0.705* (0.024)  0.339  
 
Geodesic distance from the  
   United States (1,000s of km) 
    (0.434) (0.382) (0.393)  (0.359) 
    -0.159*  -0.147* (0.038)   -0.117* 
 
=1 for contiguity with the  
   United States 
    (0.086) (0.077) (0.075)  (0.068) 
    1.002***      0.856***       0.695***  0.395  
 
=1 if the country is an island 
    (0.173) (0.187) (0.168) (0.255) 
     0.464  0.263 0.391     0.448* 
 
=1 if the country is landlocked 
    (0.298) (0.289) (0.287) (0.254) 
    -0.234 -0.259    -0.465**    -0.469** 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 
    (0.227)  (0.222) (0.200) (0.213) 
     -0.907***      -0.838***      -1.269*** 
 
% of land area in tropics and  
   sub-tropics 
(0.255) (0.234) (0.248) 
     -1.164*** 
 
Distance from the Equator  
(0.219) 
           
     0.031*** 
 
 Constant 
   (0.01)   
      
9.737*** 
               
   9.607***        9.375***        8.151***        9.453*** 
(0.117) (0.229)  (0.262) (0.352)  (0.254) 
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 
R2   0.38 0.436 0.472  0.538  0.551 
Standard errors in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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TABLE II 
Paired World Income Difference Regression (Two-way Clustering) 
          
(3) 
(1) 
SW’s column 5 
in Table IV 
(2) Baseline 
 
Adding     
KCDS 
variable 
(4) 
Adding KCDS 
variable 
SW’s Continent 
Dummy 
Region by Region fixed effects 
 
          
FST  Genetic Distance Relative 
   to the US, Weighted 
       4.414***   0.35 0.026 -0.141 
 (1.229) (1.161) (1.158)  (1.147) 
Absolute Diff. in Latitude   -0.23 -0.107    -0.479** -0.231 
 (0.228)  (0.201) (0.238)  (0.207) 
Absolute Diff. in Longitude  0.163      0.466** 0.259      0.387** 
   (0.14)  (0.178) (0.161)    (0.16) 
Distance -0.015 -0.029     -0.002     -0.022 
   (0.02)  (0.024) (0.022)  (0.022) 
=1 for two countries are contiguous        -0.341***      -0.300***     -0.250***     -0.268*** 
 (0.073) (0.065)  (0.06)     (0.062) 
=1 for either country is landlocked    0.133*       0.157***      0.166***    0.164*** 
   (0 for both are landlocked)    (0.07)   (0.06) (0.059)       (0.06) 
=1 for either country is island    0.149*  0.077 0.069       0.065 
   (0 for both are islands)  (0.084)  (0.092) (0.089)      (0.093) 
Absolute Difference in Absolute  
   Latitude 
 
  
     0.009*** 
 
  
(0.004) 
 
Difference in % of land area in   
   Tropics and Sub-Tropics 
   
0.259*** 
   
(0.093) 
Observations 10296 10296 10296 10296 
Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure A.1 
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